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Abstract 
 
Will Kymlicka has argued “democratic politics is politics in the vernacular.” Does it imply that democratic politics is 
impossible in a multilingual community, whether at the local, national, regional or global level? This paper discusses 
this assumption and maintains that democratic politics should imply the willingness of all players to make an effort to 
understand each other. Democratic politics imply the willingness to overcome the barriers to mutual understanding, 
including the linguistic ones. Any time that there is a community of fate, a democrat should search for methods that 
allow deliberation according to the two key conditions of political equality and participation. If linguistic diversity is an 
obstacle to equality and participation, some methods should be found to overcome it, as exemplified by the Esperanto 
metaphor. The paper illustrates the argument with four cases of multi-linguistic political communities: a) a school in 
California with English-speaking and Spanish-speaking students; b) the city of Byelostok in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, where four different linguistic communities (Polish, Russian, German and Yiddish) coexisted. This led 
Markus Zamenhof to invent Esperanto; c) the linguistic problems of the Indian state, and the role played by English – a 
language unspoken by the majority of the Indian population in 1947 – in developing Indian democracy; and d) the case 
of the European Parliament, with twenty languages and a wealth of interpreters and translators. 
   2
Citizens of the world, converse! 
 
Introduction 
 
A chronicler d’exception, Gustave Flaubert, tells how, during the European riots of 1848, there were people 
in Paris, the city that had triggered the revolutionary rumble, who posed the problem of finding a language 
capable of becoming a means of communication for the new Europe: 
 
Michel-Evariste-Népomucène Vincent, a former professor, proposes that European democ-
racy adopts a single language: a dead language might come in handy, an updated form of 
Latin, for example (Flaubert, 1869).
1 
 
Suggesting Latin as a new language for the continent was a way of putting all populations on the same plane 
and scaling down the aspirations of French as a lingua franca. A French-language dominated Europe would 
not have displeased the old European aristocracy (Frederick II’s and Catherine II’s French were no worse 
than Louis XVI’s), and it was explicitly requested during the Great Revolution. Anacharsis Cloots, for ex-
ample, preached the universal republic, claiming that Paris was the capital of the world and French the 
planetary language (Clootes, 1793, p. 9). These wild imaginings had been hoisted on the muskets of Napo-
leon’s troops, tardy and incoherent offspring of the Jacobins, who had imposed universal units of measure-
ment, codes and even festivities all across Europe – but always in French. If, in short, there were Parisians in 
1848 who felt Latin ought to replace French as a lingua franca, the fact should be seen as an act of humility 
intended to place all nations on the same plane – including the youngest ones that, with great fervor, were 
only just entering the European stage. 
 
Yet the equality among nations that was to be assured by reviving a dead language did not mean rendering 
individuals equal too. Latin was widespread throughout Europe, but was always known by the same social 
classes: aristocrats, intellectuals and priests. In each country, it served to exclude the majority of the popula-
tion from religious, scientific, civil and political rites. More than French, and certainly more than English or 
German, Latin brought together the members of the community of letters, but at the cost of excluding the 
great majority of the population. 
 
The idea that a common language was necessary reappeared periodically in European and world history 
every time revolutionary riots broke out. While many intellectuals attempted to design a “perfect” language 
(see Eco, 1995), the question has surfaced in politics at the Peace Congresses, in the various Workers’ Inter-
nationals and in today’s World Social Forums. Every day international organizations and the European Un-
ion have to deal with the diversity of languages, and they have to agree on new communication protocols 
among members of governments, bureaucrats and citizens. 
 
A partisan of democracy might point out that, though world history has seen cities, peoples and nations enter 
into contact by language at least as much as by the sword, the reins of that contact were held not by the ma-
jority of the population, the demos, but by an elite, the oligos. Hereditary dynasties supported by diplomats 
and tutors held a firmer grip on foreign policy than domestic policy, partly because they enjoyed a monopoly 
over linguistic communication. Democracy (demos + kratos, the power of the many) obviously seeks to 
break this monopoly and to do so it needs a suitable linguistic medium.  
 
This article explores the question, especially in the light of the idea that democratic politics, as Will Kym-
licka (2001) has argued, can only be conveyed in vernacular languages. The article is arranged as follows: 
the next section discusses the nature of linguistic rights and why they have become more important in our 
age, while section 3 argues that, although political life can draw advantage from the existence of a sole lan-
guage within a community, what differentiates democratic politics is the desire to understand not only like 
but also diverse individuals. In the absence of a linguistic medium, democratic politics stands out for its pre-
disposition to create that medium, even artificially if need be, as suggested by the Esperanto metaphor. Sec-
tion 4 addresses the implications of the linguistic question for our conception of democracy. In section 5, I 
                                                 
1With detached irony, Flaubert also recounts the debate that ensued: 
“’No, no Latin!’ said the architect, 
‘Why not?’ said the teacher. 
And these two gentlemen engaged in a discussion in which the others intervened too, each adding his own bit just to astonish, and it 
soon became so bothersome, that many went away.”   3
describe paradigmatic cases of multilingual communities and outline the policies put forward by multicul-
turalist and cosmopolitan theorists. In the final section, I draw some conclusions.  
 
Linguistic rights and political communities  
 
Over the last twenty years, a problem that had previously been stifled or even ignored in many countries – 
that of linguistic diversities within the same political community – has come forcibly to the surface. Where 
the languages of minorities were repressed for a long time – in Spain or the former Soviet republics, for ex-
ample – the importance of diversity has reemerged, leading to multilingualism or even to secession. But new 
conflicts and demands have also emerged in consolidated democratic states such as Belgium and Switzer-
land.
2 In other contexts, linguistic diversity seemed to be a consequence of changes in demographic struc-
ture: more than thirty-five million Hispanics continue to preserve their language and customs in the United 
States which, if present demographic trends continue, will soon be the second Spanish-speaking country in 
the world. For years, Berlin has been the world’s third Turkish city, while the European Union is struggling 
to build its own integration despite its plurality of languages. In short, multilingualism has become an indis-
pensable part of all or almost all political communities. Outside states, international organizations – govern-
mental and non-governmental – have increased in number and importance, and they too have to address the 
linguistic problem every day. 
 
Not that this is a total novelty. The Roman Empire was made up of a myriad of tribes, each with its own dif-
ferent language. Prior to “liberal neutrality,”
3 the Romans granted each tribe ample religious and linguistic 
autonomy, provided they paid tribute and supplied soldiers. To preserve their empire, the Romans would 
take some of the most promising sons of aristocratic families hostage and provide them with education in 
Latin, without even asking them to pay tuition fees. The young men thus often became go-betweens for col-
laboration and dominion: to the Romans it was quite clear that, since they were the dominators, their lan-
guage should therefore be the dominating one. After the Romans, many other communities had to come to 
terms with differences among languages, but it seems that these differences were tolerated insofar as indi-
viduals were subjects and not citizens. Subjects, the vast majority of whom were engaged in farming, were 
not expected to give voice to their thoughts, but only to work the land and pay taxes. The people were neither 
required nor desired to be polyglot. 
 
The resurgence of the language problem in our era is the result of two fundamental contemporary historical 
processes. The first has to do with the increased interdependence among distinct communities – what, to 
adopt a term that no one likes but cannot help using, we define as “globalization.” State political communi-
ties have become increasingly permeable to trade flows, migrations, mixed marriages and tourism. The sec-
ond phenomenon has to do with the increased importance of individual rights, which has emerged both in a 
broadening of rights in democratic states and in an increase in the number of states in which democracy is in 
force. The first process is substantially guided by civil society, whereas political institutions and the pressing 
transformations to which they are subjected drive the second. 
 
If the state is taken as a reference point of political organization, the problem of linguistic rights can be di-
vided into two major categories. The first regards the existence of different languages inside a state commu-
nity. This is the problem the various multiculturalist theorists have at heart. The second problem concerns 
multilingualism in political communities outside the state or through states. In general, this is the theme that 
cosmopolitan theorists address. Table 1 summarizes the causes and applications of linguistic rights. Each box 
shows cases in which the demand for them emerges.  
                                                 
2For a comprehensive analysis of these two cases, see McRae (1983 and 1986). 
3By liberal neutrality I obviously refer to the idea that a liberal state should not take sides in aspects of its citizens’ private lives, 
including the religion they practice and the language they speak. Cf. Kymlicka (1995), Patten (2003b, pp. 365-7). If, as Kymlicka ar-
gues, the liberal state has ever promised neutrality with regard to language, this is denied by Clare Chambers (2003, p. 301).   4
Table 1 – Causes and applications of linguistic rights 
 
Applications: 
Causes: 
Inside the state  Outside the state 
Globalization  
(guided by economic and social 
phenomena) 
Increase in languages used inside 
the state on account of migration, 
trade, media, cultural exchanges 
etc.  
Growing number of communities 
whose destinies are transversal to 
the state with common problems 
and different languages  
Democratization 
(guided by political-institutional 
factors) 
Demand for rights for original and 
newly formed linguistic minorities 
Demand to make the international 
system and its organizations more 
transparent and accountable  
  
Inside the state. Multilingual communities may be found in: a) multilingual states (such as Switzerland, Bel-
gium and India); b) states with groups of immigrants who have preserved their own language (like the His-
panics of the United States); c) states that have incorporated indigenous populations who have maintained 
their own languages (such as aborigines in the United States and in Australia). In all three cases, the demand 
for linguistic rights is addressed at an existing institution that already possesses the authority, resources and 
explicit competences to assist its citizens. This has led states to have more than one official language (the 
case of Switzerland and Belgium, for example), to promote bilingualism (the case of Canada), or to allow 
certain regional minorities to use their own languages (the case of Catalonia, Quebec and Alto Adige). Tra-
ditionally, autocratic regimes have banned the use of the languages of minorities (suffice it to think of Italy 
and Spain during Fascism), in extreme cases even repressing their use in private.  
 
But as Kymlicka (1995, pp. 111 and passim) and Patten (2003b, pp. 357 and 366) have forcefully pointed 
out, not even liberal states have been neutral towards language. While Kymlicka argues that a liberal state 
cannot be neutral, Patten suggests that this is an achievable goal. The history of nation-building has tradition-
ally involved the promotion of the official language and the repression of others, even in liberal states. States 
have explicitly or implicitly assumed that the linguistic minorities should accommodate to the majority lan-
guage. But over the last few years, multilingualism has been the direct consequence of democratization: in 
Paraguay, for example, with the holding of free elections Guara nì (the idiom spoken by the majority of the 
population) has at last become an official language alongside Spanish. In fact, the case of Paraguay shows 
that the “dominant” national language has often been not the language of the majority of the population, but 
the language of the groups holding power. 
 
The problems to be addressed are still many and various (for a review of them, and the debate among con-
trasting perspectives, see Kymlicka and Patten, 2003; Castiglione and Longman, 2005). In which cases is it 
proper for the state to provide education in languages other than the dominant one? To what extent must the 
restrictions applied to education be valid for other public services such as health and social security? Ought 
not the right to the best defense acknowledged to anyone accused of committing a crime include the right to 
be tried in his or her own mother tongue? 
 
Outside the state. A growing number of problems extend beyond state political communities. Again, the lin-
guistic dimension has acquired greater importance, both because spheres of influence outside the state have 
increased and because the problem of participation, transparency and accountability of public opinion in the 
life of existing international organizations is perceived as being increasingly important.  
 
For many years, intergovernmental organizations were considered the exclusive domain of governments: 
only governments participated directly in their activities, undertaking to represent the interests of their own 
citizens, to the extent that they could decide whether to transfer information – and what information to trans-
fer – inside their own political communities, and this substantially reduced the linguistic problem. The job of 
international organizations was to facilitate communication among narrow groups – government functionar-
ies – making available mediators such as the diplomatic corps, bureaucrats, interpreters and translators (who 
can be labelled linguistic intermediaries). It was then the mission of single governments to transmit impor-
tant information to national public opinion. But democratization did not take place only within states: over 
the last fifteen years, it has also encompassed intergovernmental organizations. On the one hand, there are 
ever more frequent requests to make international organizations more transparent and accountable to public 
opinion; on the other, such organizations have begun to supply services to individuals directly, without the   5
intermediation of state governments. A direct relationship is thus gradually being forged between world pub-
lic opinion and international organizations, and this has exacerbated the problem of linguistic communica-
tion. The transparency and control of the action of international organizations and service provision are nec-
essarily entrusted to linguistic intermediaries.  
 
It is necessary, however, to point out a fundamental difference between demands for linguistic rights inside 
and above the state. As in the case of human rights, no consolidated institutions and procedures exist above 
the state that can assume responsibility for the respect of linguistic rights. Only in very rare cases can the in-
dividual demand rights from existing international organizations. A citizen has no direct channel to access 
international organizations to demand that the services are provided in her or his own language. These re-
quests can be made by national governments only. 
 
Outside the state, the growing role of non-governmental organizations should also be considered. Amnesty 
International, Médecins sans Frontières and professional and cultural associations are in fact increasingly 
emerging as a network of global civil society.
4 Internally, such organizations have often found a lingua fran-
ca to communicate with, but whenever they enter into contact with specific local communities, they too have 
to address a linguistic problem. 
 
The problem is by no means a new one: Karl Marx wrote the Inaugural Address of the International Work-
ingmen’s Association in English and German; the dominant language of the Socialist International was Ger-
man and this created discontent among French-speaking members; the first four congresses of the Commu-
nist International relied on a myriad of willing interpreters, obliged to make long chains of translations from 
one language to another, often distorting the bellicose positions of delegates. The majority of speeches at the 
nineteenth-century Peace Congresses were in French, but many orators resorted to consecutive translation. 
At recent Social Forums, often thanks to voluntary interpreters, simultaneous translation into many lan-
guages (as many as thirteen at the World Social Forum in Mumbai in January 2004) has been commonplace, 
even at the many dozens of workshops staged. 
 
What is the language of democracy? 
 
Charles V, a man proud to reign over a true world empire, once said: “I speak Spanish to God, French to 
men, Italian to women and German to my horse.” Though he was no champion of democracy, it would have 
been interesting to ask Charles V what he thought the language of democracy was. Though we will never 
hear his answer, Will Kymlicka’s has reached us loud and clear: 
 
Democratic politics is politics in the vernacular. The average citizen feels at ease only when 
he discusses political questions in his own language. As a general rule, only elites are fluent 
in more than one language and have the chance to maintain and develop their linguistic 
skills continuously and feel at ease discussing political questions in different languages in a 
multilingual atmosphere. Moreover, political communication has a large ritual component 
and these ritual forms of communication are characteristic of a language. Even if a person 
understands a foreign language in the technical sense, he may be incapable of understanding 
political debates, if he has no knowledge of these ritual elements. For these and other rea-
sons, we can believe, as a general rule, that the more the political debate takes place in the 
vernacular, the greater the participation (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 214). 
 
If these affirmations are intended as a description of how democratic politics has evolved in the course of 
twenty-five centuries, it is hard to disagree: democracy developed in substantially restricted communities of 
people who managed to understand one another, not only through the same language but also through a set of 
tacit codes shared among their members. From the descriptive point of view, no one denies that a monolin-
gual community has considerable advantages for democratic practice: all citizens (with the sole exception of 
those with impaired hearing) are able to take part in political life, any institution (from parliament to a local 
                                                 
4Global civil society has become a term as popular as it is contested. For an overview of the different perspectives, see 
Glasius et al. (2001, 2002, 2003), Kaldor (2003), Keane (2003).   6
residents’ committee) can discuss and take resolutions without intermediaries, while government and all in-
stitutions can be controlled by citizens without any need for interpreters.
5 
 
But in how many political communities does this ideal situation really exist? Multicultural theorists have 
rightly described a real world that fails to comply with single-language or mono-ethnic states. Diversity of 
language and culture is a reality that is likely to increase inside each political community. I refer not only to 
the United States with its celebrated “melting pot” and hundreds of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Even 
countries such as Sweden and Finland, whose languages remained the exclusive domain of natives for centu-
ries, have found themselves addressing new problems due to recent immigration. At the same time, problems 
that transcend the competences of single nationwide political communities are also bound to increase: for ex-
ample, decisions on the agricultural and immigration policies of Sweden and Finland are increasingly taken 
in Brussels as opposed to Stockholm and Helsinki. 
 
Nor is it possible to ignore the fact that, albeit with some difficulty, democracy has managed to solve prob-
lems of linguistic communication. The United States has granted voting rights to immigrants from all over 
the world, and even if the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court have used exclusively English, po-
litical parties realize that, if they want to win elections, they need to attract the votes of millions of Hispan-
ics. India too has become a state with some democratic procedures despite the diversity of its languages and 
a level of well-being far below that of the United States. In order to introduce democratic institutions, India 
had to adopt the English of its colonizers as lingua franca along with Hindi, and this proved politically less 
controversial than the use of Hindi only, perceived as the language of some but not all Indians (Chandholke, 
2005).
 The same has happened in many other colonies, where the language of the colonizers has become the 
public language (often for restricted minorities), whereas vernaculars (often different one from another) have 
prevailed for private use. History has shown that language shift can be a consequence of new political boun-
daries as well as a change in boundaries can be a consequence of a language shift. 
 
Yet the present era poses new problems and new demands, greater than the ones experienced in the past. 
What can be done to address them? Neither the multiculturalist nor the cosmopolitan perspective intends to 
abandon the principles and values of democracy and tolerance. Despite the polemical fervor that has charac-
terized the recent debate, the two perspectives have more points in common than is generally recognized. I 
wish to highlight four beliefs which, I assume, are shared by both multiculturalist and cosmopolitan theorists: 
 
1)  The building of nation states was an artificial process involving the creation of an “imaginary identity” 
in the sense clarified by Anderson (1991). 
2)  In all states, the effect of ongoing cultural homogenization is to destroy local cultures and languages. 
Directly or indirectly, even liberal states support this process of homogenization.  
3)  The diversity of the planet’s languages is a value that deserves to be preserved. Once the speed with 
which old languages disappear in the contemporary world has been acknowledged,
6 it ought to be the 
job of governmental and intergovernmental institutions to preserve the linguistic variety of the planet 
through special cultural policies. 
4)  Involving the highest number of citizens in the decision-making process is a constitutive value of 
democracy and it is the job of institutions to foster their participation (Beetham, 2000). 
 
There are also important differences. Multiculturalists are keen to stress that the nation-building process 
leads to winners and losers and that the majority language group retains all gains. Cosmopolitans are less 
inclined to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the various groups since they implicitly assume that 
a establishing a common language provides advantages to all communities, and they tend to put aside the 
fact that some communities get a larger share of them. 
 
On the basis of these premises, how must democratic practice be modified to deal with the existence of mul-
tilingual political communities? To think that, in order to survive, democracy requires specific linguistic con-
ditions is to underestimate its versatility and its capacity to evolve. It is necessary, on the contrary, to modify 
                                                 
5Many other barriers will continue to exist (differences in ideology, in social class, in education level, in religious val-
ues, and so on). At least the technical barriers, though, that impede direct communication will not exist. Actually, a lack 
of language barriers will allow other social differences to emerge. 
6For paradigmatic references on the disappearance of the old languages, see Nettle and Romaine (2000) and Crystal 
(2000).   7
and extend democratic practice to enable it to live and prosper in environmental conditions – like the ones 
determined by multilingualism – different from those experienced to date. The fundamental difference be-
tween the multiculturalist and the cosmopolitan perspectives arguably emerges in the different answers they 
give to the following question: 
 
How should political communities deal with problems that cut across different linguistic 
communities, such as safeguarding individual liberties, maximizing participation and ap-
plying democratic procedures? 
 
Examples of “problems that cut across different linguistic communities” can be: the supply of education or 
health care in a multilingual neighborhood, the environmental management of a lake surrounded by two (or 
more) linguistically diverse states, the selection of a national or even international parliament. 
 
As far as the language problem is concerned, multiculturalism seeks to address common problems while con-
serving the linguistic identity of each community, thus enacting public policies which, de facto, separate 
communities by language. This is supposed to allow each community to conserve its own democratic proce-
dure in the vernacular and to minimize exclusion within each community. In short, multiculturalism places 
the onus on the cohesion – linguistic cohesion included – of the community in question. Cosmopolitanism 
moves in the opposite direction. It has no intention of modifying the composition of the political community, 
even if, as a result of historical events, this community is made up of people who speak very different lan-
guages. In the face of common problems, cosmopolitanism seeks to apply democratic procedure, imple-
menting public policies designed to remove linguistic barriers, even if this implies that some members of the 
population who are not fluent in the language used for public purposes might be somehow disadvantaged. 
 
From a normative perspective, the thesis that democratic politics has to be carried out in the vernacular is 
dangerous. I refer to all the political groups in North America and Europe that oppose the integration of im-
migrants and races, often doing so not because they are driven by authoritarian motives, but rather to pre-
serve a high level of self-determination. Such political groups may, in good faith, think that minorities who 
do not speak their language could limit the democratic life of their community and that, to preserve their de-
mocracy, it is necessary to expel, isolate or naturalize those without the same knowledge of the language and 
even repress the use of languages other than the dominant one.
7 Kymlicka’s thesis might thus lead to exactly 
the opposite effect to the one hoped for: instead of protecting the rights of minorities, it might even lead to 
their violation. 
 
For these reasons, I oppose the idea that democratic politics is politics in the vernacular with the contrasting 
thesis that democratic politics must be in Esperanto. I argue against the descriptive thesis whereby democ-
ratic politics is carried on in the vernacular by adopting the normative principle: democratic politics is not in 
Esperanto but, where necessary, it can and must be in Esperanto. Of course, I do not advocate the use of Es-
peranto, but, rather, the idea that it is the responsibility of individuals and governments to remove the lan-
guage barriers that obstruct communication. 
 
Very regular with a limited number of words, Esperanto was one of the sources of inspiration for the New-
speak of George Orwell’s 1984. It was invented by Lejzer Ludwig Zamenhof (1889) towards the end of the 
nineteenth century for instrumental reasons, namely to allow communication in multilingual communities. 
Zamenhof grew up in the city of Byelostok, in present-day Poland, then part of Tsarist Russia, where four 
different languages were spoken. Not surprisingly, practical misunderstandings arose among the four com-
munities, and Zamenhof optimistically had the idea of solving them by creating a language that each com-
munity would be able to learn easily as a second language. His ambition for this Newspeak was, obviously, 
much greater than that: if it worked for a small town in Eastern Europe, it might have universal value. Note 
that the aim of Esperanto was not to replace existing languages but to supplement them. Since then, Espe-
ranto has attracted few but fervent acolytes in every country, but has been supplanted as an international lin-
gua franca first by French, then by English. Other idioms – Mandarin Chinese, Hindi, Spanish, Russian – 
have become linguae francae in various regions of the world. Esperanto can be seen as a positive Utopia, 
perfectly symmetrical to the negative Utopia of Orwell’s Newspeak: whereas the ultimate aim of Newspeak 
was to repress thoughts against authority, the aim of Esperanto is to facilitate communication between indi-
                                                 
7This is the case of the “English Only” movement in the United States, cf. Crawford (2000). More recently, similar con-
cerns have been expressed in the provocative article by Huntington (2004).   8
viduals in the remote areas of the world, just as the introduction of universal weights and measures has 
sought to make economic and social life transparent by breaking down informational asymmetries among in-
dividuals and social classes. When a linguistic medium is lacking, the prerequisite for institutions and indi-
viduals to take part in democratic life is to create one – if need be artificially. The universal language is thus 
the key to cosmopolitan citizenship. 
 
What is democratic politics? 
 
The issue of language diversity within the same political community brings to the fore many aspects of the 
conceptions we have of democracy. If we espouse the “aggregative” model – the conception of democracy 
that favors the aggregation of preferences (as opposed to their formation) – the problem of language is con-
siderably reduced. The single members of the political community (electors) already have a definite set of 
choices before them, and if the political community is made up of individuals speaking different languages, 
it is sufficient and technically possible to make the various options available in the various languages. 
 
In an aggregative model of democracy, a political community would be able to run elections easily by pro-
viding information in all the necessary languages. It ought to be the duty and interest of each political party 
to make its program accessible to voters in the most appropriate linguistic medium. In this model, electors 
are expected to formulate their preferences and check that the political party that has won the elections car-
ries out its program, while their direct participation in political life is reduced to a minimum. If citizens were 
granted access to the administration and public services, language problems would obviously arise, but it is 
not impossible, as required by advocates of multiculturalism, to provide public services such as education 
and health in the languages most spoken by citizens. In many regions where two linguistic communities live 
side by side, public functionaries are already bilingual and the basic public services provided in more than 
one language. 
 
But both multiculturalists and cosmopolitans might hold the view that the aggregative model is not an accu-
rate description of how democracies effectively operate, still less of how they should operate. Both ap-
proaches might favor a different model of democracy, which has been defined as deliberative by Habermas 
(1998), discursive by Dryzek (2000), and communicative by Young (2000). In this model, the essence of 
democracy is to be found in communication, that is to say in the capacity to understand the reasons of others 
and to expound one’s own. In many respects, the two models of aggregative and deliberative democracy are 
not opposed (as they are too often believed to be), but, rather, two phases of the same process. The first 
phase is that of the formation of parties and political programs, in which dialogue and persuasion prevail. 
The second phase is that of choices and the aggregation of preferences at election time, during which the 
competitive arguments of political parties prevail. 
 
If deliberation is an important part of the democratic process, the language issue becomes crucial. Patten 
(2003b, p. 379) argues that “a common public language is not necessary for deliberative democracy.” This 
position is antithetical to the one of Kymlicka who, as we saw above, even goes so far as to argue that de-
mocratic politics can only be in the vernacular. Patten imagines the technical possibility of using translators 
and interpreters. In a national legislative assembly, it is certainly possible to make use of simultaneous trans-
lations (examples already exist in this respect), but the more the level of politics narrows down, the more the 
possibility of resorting to linguistic intermediaries decreases. A “strong” democracy (Barber, 1984) stands 
out partly for its more diffused, less formalized procedures: local residents’ committees, parent-teacher-
student associations, parties, and trade unions are all vital components of political life. 
 
If, in short, we abandon the merely aggregative conception of democracy, the variety of languages emerges 
as a major practical hurdle. Yet I do not believe it is possible to generate democratic culture, if the single 
components (be they neighborhoods, schools, grassroots associations, parties, trade unions or local govern-
ment) are not prepared to accept the principle of the inclusion of participants, irrespective of their linguistic 
capability. It would certainly infringe on all principles of democracy, if the various groups were to be defined 
on the basis of religious, economic or cultural criteria. So why should we consider the creation of linguistic 
confines as less atrocious? Where an obstacle to participation exists, it is up to democratic politics to seek to 
remove it. 
   9
To ask citizens to make an effort to understand each other is not a neutral act with respect to the conception 
of democracy preferred, and language is just the most evident side of mutual understanding. Understanding 
others requires patience and an investment of time and resources in education that might prove useless out-
side the political sphere. One example that comes to mind is that of the (few) Berliners who have learned the 
rudiments of Turkish to communicate with an essential part of their city’s population. To ask citizens to 
make this effort is to opt for the freedom of the ancients as opposed to that of the moderns (to use Benjamin 
Constant’s terminology), in so far as it means asking members of the community to devote time and energy 
to overcoming existing barriers to communication, even if this serves only for democratic practice. A cultural 
cosmopolitan is inclined to see an intrinsic and not only instrumental value in the opportunity of knowing an 
extra language. 
 
Policy options: a comparison between multiculturalists and cosmopolitans 
 
Arguably the best way of understanding the differences between the multiculturalist and cosmopolitan posi-
tions is to address specific cases. In this section, I discuss four paradigmatic cases: a neighborhood school, a 
multilingual city, a great multi-ethnic country and a supranational parliament. We obviously find significant 
differences both among multiculturalist theorists
8 and among cosmopolitans (in particular, between ethical 
and institutional cosmopolitans). Though I do not attempt to represent all the various positions faithfully, I 
do believe that it is useful to outline paradigmatic cases – if need be forcing them somewhat – to identify the 
differences between the two approaches.  
 
A state school in California. In a state school in a district of Pasadena, California, traditionally dominated by 
English-speaking pupils, demographic trends and waves of immigration are causing a sizeable growth in the 
number of Hispanic pupils. Since a certain demographic decline has been recorded among the Anglos, the 
school manages to assimilate the new Hispanic students quite easily; indeed their presence has saved the 
school from being closed due to lack of numbers. The problem is that the two communities differ in terms of 
income level, culture, religion and language.  
 
The overall demographic data for Pasadena show that English is spoken at home by 55 percent of the popula-
tion only, and that nearly 30 percent speak Spanish. These facts are obviously reflected in schools: the His-
panic students do not speak English well and their parents speak it even worse. School parent-student meet-
ings end in pandemonium with the Anglos complaining that their children are starting to make a lot of spell-
ing mistakes and the Hispanics protesting because their children are being bullied. At the end of a stormy 
meeting, an Anglo father, citing Samuel Huntington, invites the Hispanic community to dream in English. In 
return, an outraged Mexican slaps him in the face!
9 
 
The headmaster, a man with a fine sense of intuition, perceives that the Anglos are worried that the identity 
of their neighborhood is going to be lost. The Hispanics also have identity problems, and they are worried 
because their children receive lower marks than the others. Hispanics aren’t even as good at sports as the An-
glos, largely because the principal game played is American football. A number of the Hispanic parents were 
born and bred in the United States, but they still do not have a great command of English. Since many of 
them are cleaners in the homes of the Anglos, their aspiration is to enable their children to live in conditions 
that will avoid perpetuating the class division based on different ethnic groups.  
 
The headmaster calls in a multiculturalist researcher and asks him to study the problem and come up with a 
solution. After a few weeks, the researcher submits a prospectus in which he divides the pupils into different 
sections, A and H. Adopting an ingenious restructuring program, he demonstrates that it is possible to teach 
in English in section A and Spanish in section H. The parents are free to choose the section they want for 
their children, though Anglos might be expected to enroll theirs in A and Hispanics to enroll theirs in H. 
Without any extra costs, the project also envisages the teaching of the other language in both sections, al-
lowing the Anglos to pick up some Spanish and Hispanics to study English as a second language. The multi-
culturalist also notes that sport is a central element of group identity and that it would be wrong to prevent 
                                                 
8In particular, between Kymlicka (1995) and Parekh (2002). For a variety of perspectives on multiculturalism, see Kelly 
(2002). 
9Huntington (2004, p. 45): “There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant Society. Mexican-
Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English.”   10
Hispanics from playing the game they prefer and perform best at. Hence, while American football is to be 
played in section A, soccer will be introduced to section H. 
 
The headmaster is puzzled. He wonders whether the project complies with the American constitution, and 
though California has been granted constitutional derogations, he decides to call in a cosmopolitan researcher 
for a second opinion. A few days later, the cosmopolitan submits his project. On the frontispiece is a quota-
tion from Thomas Pogge (2003, p. 118): “ … the best education for children is the education which is best 
for each child.” The plan envisages that all pupils receive the same education in English, since this is the 
dominant language in the country in which they live and also the dominant lingua franca worldwide. It in-
cludes tables which show that American citizens with a good knowledge of English have: a) higher incomes, 
b) less risk of being unemployed, c) less risk of being imprisoned, d) better hopes for a longer life. Another 
table shows how English is snowballing as a second language in every continent, and asks whether it is the 
public school’s job – at least in terms of statistical probability – to condemn the pupil to earn less, risk being 
unemployed, end up in jail and even live shorter lives in order to preserve the language of his or her linguis-
tic community. As regards sports, the study proposes the adoption of baseball, popular in both the Caribbean 
and in North America. 
 
Not content with demonstrating once and for all the advantages for the well-being of young pupils of teach-
ing in English, the cosmopolitan also suggests introducing compulsory courses of Spanish language and 
culture for all, proposing as core subjects for a common identity the myth of Zorro, Ernest Hemingway and 
Isabel Allende. The adoption of a single section makes it possible to save money, which the researcher sug-
gests using for evening courses in English for the parents of the Hispanics. Preempting a predictable objec-
tion from the Anglos – namely that the parents of the other ethnic group will accumulate more resources – 
the cosmopolitan proposes evening courses in salsa and other Latin American dances for the Anglo parents. 
He also proposes setting up a tourist association to organize holidays in the Caribbean and Central America. 
After reading the project carefully, the headmaster is still perplexed.  
 
The Byelostok problem. An emblematic case is that of Zamenhof’s home town of Byelostok. As mentioned 
above, in the second half of the nineteenth century four linguistic communities lived in the town: Poles 
(3,000), Russians (4,000), Germans (5,000) and Jews (18,000). This created many practical problems for 
commerce, education and basic public life that the Tsarist regime permitted in a territory that it had con-
quered only relatively recently. The most populous linguistic community, the Jews, did not have a large writ-
ten corpus to rely upon in their own vernacular language, Yiddish, whereas two other linguistic communities, 
the Germans and the Russians, could count upon the consolidation of the language and culture of the two 
great bordering states, Germany and Russia. 
  
Acknowledging the difference, a multiculturalist would probably have suggested setting up four ethnic coun-
cils, each endowed with broad autonomy over the provision of services such as education and health. He or 
she would also have set up a “Chamber of Compensation” to help citizens exchange their homes if they 
wished, to make the city divisible into four homogeneous linguistic neighborhoods. This would have greatly 
reduced problems of linguistic misunderstanding in commerce and facilitated education in the languages of 
the four communities. As we have seen, the ingenious solution of Zamenhof, a true champion of cosmopol-
itanism, was to create an artificial new language, Esperanto, designed to place the various communities on 
the same plane and, moreover, to enable them to communicate with all the citizens of the world. The fact that 
the solution was unworkable should not prevent us from admiring its grandiose ambition, whereby a local 
problem was intended to provide the thrust for a universal language. A less ingenious solution – but arguably 
likely to yield more tangible fruits – would have been to create bilingualism for education and public com-
munication in the main Slav language (Russian) and German (which bears many resemblances to Yiddish), 
allowing and developing the private use of other vernacular languages. Though constituting the absolute ma-
jority in the city, the Jewish community might have been concerned by this solution, but it would have taken 
into account the fact almost all the members of the community had a certain fluency in at least one other lan-
guage. Zamenhof would probably have agreed with Van Parijs’s proposal (Van Parijs, 2003, p. 167), accord-
ing to which the linguistic communities required to study the language of the others, in this case the Jews and   11
Poles, would be entitled to tangible compensations from the communities not required to study other lan-
guages.
10 
 
The case of India. India, unique for its infinity of ethnic groups and languages, is the second largest popula-
tion in the world and totals about a sixth of the world’s inhabitants. Nonetheless, following independence, 
India managed to constitute a parliamentary democracy that has been relatively successful for a developing 
country (see Kohli, 2000). This has been possible, thanks in part to a national Parliament, whose members 
are elected in all the federal states. The best approach to the linguistic problem has proved to be pragmatism, 
accompanied by a healthy dose of flexibility and tolerance. Unlike in Italy, all attempts to create a unitary 
language as a means of fortifying national identity have so far failed (see Annamalai, 2001). The desire to 
create an Indian identity on the basis of a common language, Hindi, different from that of the old English 
colonizers – supported by none other than Mohandas Gandhi, among others – has proved to be a factor of di-
vision rather than of union. To solve linguistic conflicts, it has thus been established that communication be-
tween central government and the single states may be made in both Hindi and English. The country current-
ly boasts as many as eighteen official languages, very few compared to the 1,650 languages actually spoken. 
A system has thus been created in which vernacular languages are used locally, one of the official languages 
is used for the political life of the single states, and the languages of communication for national politics are, 
de facto, Hindi and English (Chandholke, 2005, p. 44). 
 
A multiculturalist would notice immediately that Indian democracy is limited by the fact that the members of 
linguistic minorities have no possibility of controlling the acts of Parliament and Government. In the Parlia-
ment itself, the variety of different idioms means that there is no certainty that the members of linguistic mi-
norities are able to understand each other. For a multiculturalist, it might have been fitter if, in 1947, India 
had been separated into twenty independent states instead of just two. This would have allowed each com-
munity greater political participation in their vernacular languages, and even though none of the twenty in-
dependent states would have been linguistically homogeneous, it would have been possible to protect lin-
guistic minorities by adopting the policies multiculturalists champion in countries such as Canada or Spain. 
 
A cosmopolitan, on the contrary, would see the formation of a great nation in the wake of British coloniza-
tion as a great advantage for the populations of the geographical area in question. In all likelihood, the for-
mation of a federal state was in fact the best form of protection for the various ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities. Without it, conflicts would have broken out in the Indian peninsula as bloody as the ones that 
took place in the course of the subdivision of the Indian Union and Pakistan in 1947, nor can we rule out that 
interstate conflicts would have been generated analogous to those that have dominated African political life 
over the last sixty years. The fact that everyone can consider themselves Indian irrespective of language has 
reduced political violence, and the fact that each individual has been allowed to speak his or her own ver-
nacular language has prevented traumatic changes of identity. Though Indians did not choose their coloniz-
ers, the fact that they spoke English rather than Dutch or Portuguese gave India a notable advantage in so far 
as the country has thus had direct access to the dominant contemporary idiom. True, this has so far favored 
elites as opposed to the majority of the population,
11 but today suitable education policies can make English a 
notable competitive advantage for the development of Indian society. 
 
Looking to the future, a multiculturalist would probably seek to increase the number of official languages, 
along with local political autonomy and the preservation and teaching of the various vernacular languages. 
This would lead to a greater conservation of local languages but also more difficult economic, social and po-
litical integration at both national and international levels. A cosmopolitan, on the contrary, would tend to in-
vest more in education in English alongside local languages to make English the intra-national and interna-
tional lingua franca. The consequences would be the opposite of those wished for by multiculturalists: many 
of the local languages would probably be lost, but India would gain in terms of both national and interna-
tional integration. 
                                                 
10Van Parijs’s proposal could be implemented at least in the academic community, where English has asserted itself un-
equivocally as a lingua franca, and where the most diffused, read and cited academic journals are Anglo-American. 
This offers English native speakers a notable advantage and all the rest a notable disadvantage. By way of compensa-
tion, it would not be a bad idea for academics from other countries to ask their privileged native English-speaking col-
leagues to correct their howlers. 
11Estimates provided by the International Corpus of English indicates that the portion of the Indian population able to 
speak English vary from 4 to 20 percent (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/english-usage/ice/iceind.htm#).   12
The European Parliament. The European Parliament currently has twenty official languages. So far the num-
ber has increased together with that of the member states of the European Union. De facto, the official lan-
guages are those of the member states. There are no official languages for sub-state linguistic communities 
(the most significant claim for recognition being that of Catalan). The members of Parliament rely on simul-
taneous translation, and documents are translated into the official languages. As official languages have in-
creased, so the translation procedure has grown more complex: there are currently 20 x 19 = 380 possible 
language communications (“into” and “from”), and finding interpreters capable of translating, for example, 
from Portuguese to Slovak or Lithuanian to Maltese and vice versa is often impossible. Hence the recourse to 
“double translations” (for example, from Portuguese to French and from French to Slovak). Yet even this 
vast linguistic “menu” fails to accommodate all the European languages and – albeit rarely – members of 
linguistic minorities sometimes speak their own mother tongues. 
 
The problem has become greater with the expansion of member states and it will continue to grow when Bul-
garia, Rumania and possibly Turkey join the EU.
 Of the close on 5,000 employees of the European Parlia-
ment, 340 are translators and 238 interpreters, but the multiplication of languages could lead to a doubling of 
this figure. In a situation of this kind, the problem understandably arises of reducing the number of official 
languages of the European Parliament, though, politically speaking, it is a thorny one (see Mamadouh, 2002; 
Phillipson, 2003; Van Parijs, 2005). The advantage would be more effective debating, whereas the disadvan-
tage would be — de facto if not de iure — the limitation of the passive electorate to elites who speak foreign 
languages. 
 
The members of the European Parliament may express themselves in any official language (Art. 117 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament), though they generally speak in the language of their coun-
try. Willy Brandt was one of the first members to make a speech to the Parliament in a language that was not 
his mother tongue, speaking in English as opposed to German.
12 He opted for self-translation. His choice was 
justified by the fact that the number of members who understood English was far higher than that of those 
who speak German. The choice was welcomed with warm applause and a few whistles. Multiculturalists 
would probably have whistled at him since he would have been incomprehensible for electors in his own 
constituency, who are nevertheless entitled to exercise control over their elected member. Brandt also com-
pelled his German colleagues who did not understand English (possibly because they were not members of 
an elite) to listen to the speech of a fellow countryman in translation. Cosmopolitans would have applauded 
him warmly in so far as he was reducing the linguistic distance between members of Parliament, hence pro-
moting a common language for European politics. 
 
Today proposals are being made to reduce the official languages to two, three or four, and the organs of the 
European Parliament have also posed themselves the problem of limiting the extensive use of interpreters 
and translations. Multiculturalists are probably hostile to these proposals because they would reduce the 
number of effectively eligible candidates (only citizens with a good knowledge of at least one official lan-
guage could perform their role as members). Furthermore, though all parliamentary documents would con-
tinue to be available in the twenty or more official languages, there would always be the danger that an As-
sembly working in only a few languages would distance itself from the electorate and ultimately turn into an 
oligarchy.  
 
The cosmopolitans, on the contrary, believe that communication in one or a few languages would make par-
liamentary debate more authentic and direct (Van Parijs, 2005). They would suggest leaving just two official 
languages, English and French, and placing all members on the same plane, asking the English to speak in 
French and the French to speak in English. They would also point that, albeit elected in one country, Euro 
MPs have to respond to the population of Europe, not only to their own constituency. Besides, to be able to 
work well in a legislative assembly, it is necessary to be able to speak, informally if need be, with one’s col-
leagues, and to do this it is necessary to have knowledge of the most common languages. To avoid being es-
                                                 
12For precision’s sake, it is worth adding that, perhaps ignorant of the proposal made 131 years earlier by Michel-
Evariste-Népomucène Vincent, the extreme left-wing Italian member Mario Capanna provocatively made a speech in 
Latin in the session of November 13, 1979, spreading panic among the interpreters’ booths. One of the few to under-
stand his speech perfectly was the Euro MP Otto of Hapsburg, a direct descendant of the Royal House of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and an elected member for the right-wing Catholic Party (CSU) in Bavaria. His family lost 
Lombardy-Veneto in 1860s and his Italian was rusty, so he congratulated his colleague in Latin. This was perhaps one 
of the last occasions in which, albeit at different ends of the political spectrum, European elites communicated in Latin.    13
corted by a squad of interpreters, each member of the Parliament should be able to communicate with col-
leagues in a common language. In short, the cosmopolitans would prefer an impoverished but directly under-
standable language to a myriad of more colorful yet non-accessible languages. A parliament in which each 
member speaks a language incomprehensible to others is not only ridiculous, but also useless.  
 
For linguistic cosmopolitanism  
 
The cosmopolitan position is founded on an assumption that needs to be made clear: namely, that nothing 
prevents human beings from mastering two or more languages.
13 Recent linguistic research clearly demon-
strates that there is no obstacle to children learning two languages,
14 and whole countries in the civilized 
world implement compulsory education programs to enable students to learn properly not only their own 
mother tongue but also English. This is not necessarily to the detriment of the vernacular language, whose 
cultural value may be better understood (as an expression of the variety of humankind) precisely by indi-
viduals who speak more than one language. Polyglots are capable of appreciating the value of linguistic di-
versity much better than the illiterate.  
 
To master a universal language is not to relinquish the language of one’s own ethnic group. A more realistic 
solution than Esperanto was suggested by Aldous Huxley in The Island (1962), a novel that describes an 
utopian small community in the Pacific, the imaginary island of Pala, as advanced as it is rooted in its own 
traditions. This community preserves its own local language, but all of its members speak English, and this 
allows them access to technology, information and culture from the most advanced regions of the world. In 
the real world, the countries with the highest indices of human development – Norway, Sweden, Holland – 
are very close to Huxley’s ideal. 
 
On a planet on which one-third of the population is still illiterate it is undoubtedly innovative to think in 
terms of institutionalizing a sort of bilingualism. It comes as a surprise to find out that two-thirds of the 
planet’s inhabitants are already bilingual today (Baker and Prys Jones, 1998, section 1), but this still fails to 
bring the peoples of the world together, simply because no language of communication exists: in a word, 
what is lacking is a common language spoken by everyone as a second or third language. Yet, in the course 
of two or three generations, it may be possible to find a widely diffused linguistic medium. Rather than 
choose today between Vernacular and Esperanto, it might be more useful to support investment in education 
to allow individuals to increase their language skills. 
 
In India and Europe, multilingualism can already be seen in action (see Laitin, 1997; Mamadouh, 2002; Van 
Parijs, 2005; for Europe, and Annamalai, 2001; and Chandholke, 2005; for India). The British in Europe and 
Hindis in India are among the privileged who can afford to speak a single language, whereas many others 
have to speak at least two (English as lingua franca and their own vernacular language), others still already 
speak three (like the Catalans who need to speak Spanish as the dominant language of their state, and English 
as the dominant European and international language). I do not intend to argue that linguistic access is open 
to all: as Kymlicka rightly points out, elites are still at an advantage and, in a globalized world, also enjoy a 
linguistic privilege. The development of common languages will inevitably prove more advantageous to 
some groups than to others, although this is something that public policies should try to compensate for. It is 
far too easy to make a society more egalitarian by making polyglots illiterate, but an enlightened social pol-
icy ought to attempt to make the illiterate polyglot.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13Multilingualism as a possible solution is strongly argued by a multiculturalist such as May (2003) and by a cosmopoli-
tan such as Van Parjis (2005). As far as education is concerned, and irrespective of the polemical fervor that has fuelled 
the debate so far, it seems possible to say that cosmopolitans want education to be carried out in the language of the ma-
jority for everybody and that the language of the minority be taught as a second language, whereas multiculturalists 
desire the opposite: that is, they want the principal language be that of each community and the dominant language to be 
taught as a second language to the minority. See Patten (2003a).  
14See Baker and Prys Jones (1998). The case is argued on the multiculturalist front, by May (2003).   14
References 
 
Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities. London: Verso. 
Annamalai, E. (2001) Managing Multilingualism in India. Political and Linguistic Manifestations. London: 
Sage. 
Barber, B. (1984) Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press. 
Baker C. and S. Prys Jones (eds.). (1998) Encyclopaedia of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education. Clevedon 
PA: Multilingual Matters.  
Beetham, D. (2000) Democracy and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Castiglione, D. and Longman, C. (eds.). (2005) The Challenge of Multilingualism in Law and Politics. Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing. 
Chambers, C. (2003) “Nation-building, Neutrality and Ethnocultural Justice: Kymlicka's ‘liberal pluralism,’” 
Ethnicities 3: 295-319. 
Chandholke, N. (2005) “Negotiating Linguistic Diversity in Democracies: A Comparative Study of the 
U.S.A. and India,” in S. Bajpeyi (ed.), Democracy and Diversity: A Comparative Study of India and 
the U.S., forthcoming. 
Crystal, D. (2000) Language Death. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Cloots, A. (1793) La République Universelle, in A. Clootes, Œuvres. Paris: Kraus Reprint, 1980. 
Crawford, J. (2000) At War with Diversity: U.S. Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety. Buffalo NY: Multi-
lingual Matters. 
Dryzek, J. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Eco, U. (1995) In search for perfect language. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. 
Flaubert, G. (1869) L’education sentimentale. Paris: Bordas, 1974. 
Glasius, M., Kaldor, M., and Anheier, H. (2001, 2002, 2003) Global Civil Society Yearbook. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1998) The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Huntington, S. (2004) “The Hispanic Challenge,” Foreign Policy, March-April: 30-45. 
Kaldor, M. (2003) Global Civil Society. An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Keane, J. (2003) Global Civil Society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kelly, P. (ed.) (2002) Multiculturalism Reconsidered. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Kohli, A. (ed.) (2000). The Success of Indian Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kymlicka, W. (2001) Politics in the Vernacular. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kymlicka, W. and Patten, A. (eds.) (2003) Language Rights and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 
Mamadouh, V. (2002) “Dealing with Multilingualism in the European Union: Cultural Theory Rationalities 
and Language Policies,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 4: 327-345. 
May, S. (2003) “Misconceiving Minority Language Rights: Implications for Liberal Political Theory,” in W. 
Kymlicka and A. Patten (eds.), Political Theory and Language Policy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
McRae, K. (1983) Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland. Waterloo, Ontario: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 
McRae, K. (1986) Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press. 
Nettle, D. and Romaine, S. (2000) Vanishing Voices: The Extinction of the World’s Languages. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Parekh, B. (2002) Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Patten, A. (2003a) “What Kind of Bilingualism?” in W. Kymlicka and A. Patten (eds.), Political Theory and 
Language Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Patten, A. (2003b) “Liberal Neutrality and Language Policy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31: 356-386. 
Phillipson, R. (2003) English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy. London: Routledge. 
Pogge, T. (2003) “Accomodation Rights for Hispanics in the United States,” in W. Kymlicka and A. Patten 
(eds.), Political Theory and Language Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   15
Van Parijs, P. (2003) “Linguistic Justice,” in W. Kymlicka and A. Patten (eds.), Political Theory and Lan-
guage Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Van Parijs, P. (2005) “Europe’s Three Language Problems,” in D. Castiglione and C. Longman (eds.) The 
Challenge of Multilingualism in Law and Politics. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Young, I. M. (2000) Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zamenhof, L. L. (1889) An Attempt Towards an International Language, translated by Henry Phillips Jr. 
New York: H. Holt. 